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Impulsivity influences betting 
under stress in laboratory gambling
Natale Canale1, Enrico Rubaltelli1, Alessio Vieno1, Andrea Pittarello2 & Joël Billieux3,4
Although recent research suggests that acute stress influences subsequent decision-making under 
ambiguity, less is known about the role of personality variables in this relationship. This study tested 
whether impulsivity traits and acute stress differentially influence the way in which a prior feedback is 
incorporated into further decisions involving ambiguity. Sixty college students (50% male; aged 18–25 
years) were randomly assigned to a stress versus a non-stress condition before completing a laboratory 
gambling task. The results revealed that independently of the stress condition, subjects behaved as 
if the odds of winning increase after a single loss. Additionally, stress effects varied as a function of 
impulsivity traits. Individuals who lacked perseverance (i.e., had difficulty focusing on a difficult or 
boring task) gambled more after experiencing a loss in the stress condition than did those in the control 
condition. The present study supports that impulsivity traits can explain the differential effect of stress 
on the relationship between prior feedback and choices made under ambiguity.
Everyday decision-making (e.g., choosing the correct alternatives in an exam or making an appropriate decision 
in an emergency situation) is often made under stressful conditions, in which predictions of ambiguous options 
can be altered by stress1. According to a recent meta-analysis2, two types of mechanisms may explain how acute 
stress influences subsequent decision-making in situations of ambiguity. First, acute stress tends to increase reli-
ance on immediate and potentially high rewards at the cost of considering potential delayed losses3. From such 
a perspective, increased reward seeking is supposed to be the underlying mechanism for poor performance. 
Second, the excessive release of dopamine, noradrenaline, and cortisol related to stress impairs executive control 
(for a review, see Hermans et al.4), leading people to rushed and unsystematic decision-making characterized 
by a tendency to elude the available options (for a review, see Janis & Mann5). Another candidate factor that 
has been linked to biased or maladaptive decision-making under stress refers to personality variables. Actually, 
little attention has been directing toward the potential moderating role of personality traits in disadvantageous 
decision-making according to a recent meta-analysis2. The current study thus aimed to address this gap in the 
literature.
In ambiguous situations in which the probability of an outcome is largely unknown, individuals have to infer 
these probabilities by relying on previous feedbacks associated with similar decisions made in the past. This 
feedback can be used to rely on adaptive strategies during decision-making, such as balancing choices based on 
reinforcement schedules or outcome probabilities. In other words, adapted decision-making generally requires 
inferring the expected reward values of each option based on the consequences of previous choices and favour-
ing the options with the higher expected value. According to the influential somatic marker hypothesis6, when 
faced with a context of ambiguity, individuals unconsciously take into account (or do not) previous positive and 
negative outcomes of their actions on the basis of “somatic markers” (e.g., feelings and hunches experienced 
after receiving feedback)7. Somatic markers are generally considered anticipatory emotional reactions processed 
implicitly and triggered by a situation in which a decision has to be made. The somatic marker hypothesis also 
states that the connection between somatic marker (or feedback) processing and decision-making is susceptible 
to be influenced by individual differences in reinforcement sensitivity (e.g., a heightened sensitivity to rewards 
and/or punishments), especially when decisions must be made in situations of ambiguity in which no other clues 
besides feedback are available8. More recently, a revised model of decision-making under objective risk condi-
tions9 proposed, in line with classic dual process models10, 11, that information about the decision situation is 
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processed via two distinct modes: an impulsive system (involving emotional reactions, conditioning, and somatic 
activity) and a reflective system (involving working memory, executive functions, and reasoning). External influ-
ences, such as stress, may interfere with the processes underlying the reflective system, which are necessary for the 
normative calculation of probabilities and/or monitoring of feedback.
Research suggests that stress-induced changes may alter both executive functioning and emotional feedback 
processing2. Stress leads to an increase in dopaminergic activity through the release of the stress hormone corti-
sol12, and this elevated dopamine response has been suggested to influence reward prediction and feedback learn-
ing13. More precisely, individuals experiencing stress have been found to focus on more immediate gratification 
and tend to have difficulties in delaying rewards3. In addition, an increase of dopamine level under acute stress 
is responsible for a decrease in the willingness to avoid potential losses in laboratory decision-making tasks. For 
example, in a study using a task measuring decision-making when the odds are known (game of dice task14), it 
appeared that individuals are susceptible to stress-induced disadvantageous decision-making (i.e., they take more 
risks and focus on potential high short-term rewards and neglect potential higher long-term punishments).
Decision-making under ambiguity is also influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. The classic econ-
omy theory states that rational agents should not consider the outcome of past experiences on decisions to take 
a new gamble15. According to this rationalist perspective, each new decision to gamble should be considered an 
independent event. However, it is established that individuals are actually influenced by past experiences (recent 
outcomes) when making choices with ambiguous results. For example, real-life gamblers regularly display the 
“gambler’s fallacy” phenomenon16, or the tendency to respond to losses by increasing one’s bet, which reflects 
an inability to acknowledge the independence of turns. Gambling tasks have regularly been used to examine 
decision-making under ambiguity that require the processing of feedback of previous decisions. In this vein, 
FeldmanHall et al.17 found that in a gambling task (unknown probabilities of possible outcomes) in which partic-
ipants are required to choose to gamble between 0€ and 10€, individuals gambled more after experiencing a loss 
than a win. The authors interpreted this finding by assuming that participants behave as if the odds of winning 
increase after a single and/or run (e.g., two) of loss outcomes. Such behaviour seems to reflect a distorted cog-
nition that is often present in people displaying disordered gambling behaviours16. Furthermore, FeldmanHall 
et al.’s experiment17 also showed that acute stress, induced by using the cold pressor test (CPT18), did not impact 
the use of past experiences for subsequent decision-making under ambiguity among participants. However, it 
remains unclear whether individual differences (e.g., personality traits) could actually help in explaining the dif-
ferential effect of stress in the relationship between prior feedback and choices made under ambiguity.
In reviewing the literature on the effects of stress on decisions under ambiguity, little attention has been 
devoted to personality variables, which have been found to moderate the effect of stress on decision-making 
(see Starcke & Brand2 for a recent meta-analysis). More specifically, the few studies that have assessed the effect 
of personality traits on decisions made under stress reported that trait anxiety interacts with acute stress in 
predicting risky decisions19–21. Nevertheless, one aspect of personality susceptible to playing a pivotal role in 
decision-making under stress is impulsivity (see Starcke & Brande22 for a review). Impulsivity, which is a con-
struct included in almost all major personality models23, is known to influence a wide range of common behav-
iours (e.g., eating, consumer behaviours) and thus constitutes an important aspect of daily life decision-making. 
Moreover, impulsivity is also consistently related to gambling disorders (see MacLaren et al.24 for a review). On 
a broader level, impulsivity can be considered a trans-diagnostic etiological factor involved in the aetiology of a 
wide range of mental and neurological disorders characterized by decision-making impairment25. It is currently 
acknowledged that impulsivity is an “umbrella” construct which includes several distinct traits23, 26. In the last dec-
ade, the UPPS (Urgency-Premeditation-Perseverance-Sensation Seeking) Impulsive Behavior Scale has become 
one of the most used instruments to assess the multifaceted nature of impulsivity23, 27, especially in the gambling 
field28. The UPPS model23, 27 distinguishes between five specific impulsivity components: (i) negative urgency, the 
tendency to act rashly when experiencing intense negative emotions; (ii) premeditation, the tendency to take into 
account the consequences of an act before engaging in that act; (iii) perseverance, the ability to remain focused 
on a task that may be boring and/or difficult; (iv) sensation-seeking, the tendency to enjoy and pursue activities 
that are exciting and openness to trying new experiences; and (v) positive urgency, the tendency to act rashly 
when experiencing intense positive emotions. Some studies reported relationships between the facets of the UPPS 
model and the performance in the Iowa gambling task (IGT), a classic paradigm measuring decision-making 
under ambiguity14. More specifically, a proneness for disadvantageous choices in IGT performance was related 
to a heightened level of negative urgency29–31 and a reduced level of premeditation32 in healthy individuals. As 
negative urgency is conceptualized as a type of emotion laden impulsivity and based on existing evidence having 
linked this impulsivity facet to poorer performances in the IGT, it is reasonable to expect that individual differ-
ences in negative urgency will influence decision-making under stress. Moreover, a corpus of behavioural and 
neuroimaging data suggests that heightened negative urgency could be at least partly due to prepotent response 
inhibition impairment29, 33. Although these results concern negative urgency (these studies did not assess positive 
urgency), it is reasonable to assume that processes underlying positive and negative urgency are at least partly 
similar, as emphasized in a recent meta-analysis showing very similar associations between both positive and 
negative urgency and psychopathological symptoms34. Accordingly, and taking into account the impairing nature 
of emotional arousal on the efficacy of executive functioning35, 36, it is likely that individuals with elevated positive 
and/or negative urgency levels will be more prompt to display hazardous decision-making in stressful situations. 
In a recent study conducted by Wise and colleagues37, it was shown that risky decisions under stress – measured 
using the balloon analogue risk task (BART38) – were affected by complex interactions between the UPPS-P 
impulsivity traits and gender. They found that stress effects varied as a function of gender and impulsivity traits 
(negative urgency, positive urgency and lack of perseverance). In particular, Wise and colleagues37 reported that 
stressed women with low perseverance made fewer risky decisions, whereas stressed men with higher persever-
ance made more risky decisions.
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Thus, based on existing evidence, it is likely that impulsivity traits – negative and positive urgency, lack of per-
severance and lack of premeditation – may moderate the effect of stress on decision-making under ambiguity. It 
is conceivable that acute stress influences subsequent decision-making under ambiguity in high emotion contexts 
(e.g., negative urgency). According to limited cognitive resource theories39, it is likely that under acute stress, cog-
nitive resources are directed to emotion regulation and take away from the inhibitory processes that are required 
to restrain from impulsive choices. An alternative explanation would be that limited cognitive resources caused 
by stress40, such as attentional difficulties, may make individuals characterized by low perseverance particularly 
vulnerable toward disadvantageous decisions.
Substantial evidence indicated that stress, past experiences (i.e., the influence of prior feedback), and impul-
sivity traits conjointly affect decision-making processes. However, no studies to date have attempted to disentan-
gle the interplay of these various factors in an experimental design. Therefore, the present study aimed to extend 
previous research by differentiating the mechanisms of decision-making under acute stress as a function of indi-
vidual differences in impulsivity traits. More specifically, this study tested whether impulsivity traits and acute 
stress differentially influence the way in which prior feedback is incorporated into further decisions involving 
ambiguity. Previous studies have found that the nature of feedback can promote both conservative and risky 
decisions in the condition of decision under risk (see Schiebener and Brand for a recent review9). Schiebener 
and Brand9 suggested that these differences may be systematically related to the feedback structure (e.g., positive 
feedback versus negative feedback), such that the feedback occurring after a decision is used to (i) check the 
outcome of the current decision-making strategy and (ii) monitor and eventually revise the applied strategy41. In 
the current study, we investigated whether individuals rely on immediate feedback related to a previous decision 
for making more advantageous decisions. For this purpose, we tested and compared two models that included 
decision-making under ambiguity, stress, impulsivity, and feedback. The difference between the two models is 
the way in which the feedback was coded. More specifically, in model 1, feedback was coded as −1 for a loss in 
the gambling task, as 0 for a trial in which the participant chose not to gamble, and as 1 for a win in the gambling 
task (two specific contrasts are analysed in model 1: win relative to loss, and no feedback relative to loss), while in 
model 2 it was coded as 0 for no feedback and as 1 for a loss/win (a single contrast is analysed in model 2: no 
feedback relative to loss/win).
Here, we defined stress as a physiological response of the organism that occurs whenever a demand exceeds 
regulatory capacity, particularly in unpredictable and uncontrollable situations42. A classic paradigm used to 
induce stress experimentally in the laboratory is the CPT18, in which participants must immerse one hand in 
a basin of icy water. By directly manipulating acute stress with the CPT – indexed by subjective parameters 
of stressors43, we conducted an experiment designed to test whether impulsivity traits and acute stress would 
differentially influence the way in which prior feedback is incorporated into decisions involving ambiguity. The 
present experiment was conducted with the gambling task used by FeldmanHall et al.17 to assess decisions under 
ambiguity (the source of ambiguity is the fact the probability of winning gambles are unknown to participants). 
In this laboratory gamble task, participants were required to choose in a series of trials whether to gamble an 
amount between 0€ and 10€. The task required the participant to make 36 choices (36 trials), and in each trial, 
participants could win or lose their money. After each decision, subjects were informed about the outcome (i.e., 
feedback is provided).
Consistent with the theoretical backgrounds reviewed, we expect that, in a stress condition, participants char-
acterized by elevated negative urgency will gamble more after having experienced a loss in a previous trial than 
those with higher negative urgency in a non-stress condition, as this facet of impulsivity has been postulated to 
promote the involvement in rushed action aiming at relieving negative affect27. Participants in the stress con-
dition and characterized by higher negative urgency should display reduced executive control that overrides 
emotion-induced risk taking propensities in favour of executive control, decreasing the probability of making 
advantageous decision-making9. Furthermore, we also hypothesized that the probability of choosing to gamble 
after a loss will be higher in stressed subjects with lower levels of premeditation and perseverance, as these cogni-
tive dimensions of impulsivity have respectively been related to poor decision-making abilities44 and impairment 
in resistance to proactive interference (i.e., the ability to inhibit previous information that is no longer relevant)45, 46. 
Stress combined with lower perseverance/premeditation should strengthen the impulsive system, which in turn 
is susceptible to interfere with the controlled extraction of information, deliberation, or planning (reflective sys-
tem), leading participants to act against their better knowledge (e.g., gambled more after experiencing a loss in the 
previous trial)9. Our interest focused on negative urgency, lack of premeditation and lack of perseverance due to 
relationships with risky decisions under stress37 and proneness for risky choices during the IGT29, 32. Additionally, 
positive urgency was not considered because it is conceptually very similar to negative urgency (see Berg et al.34 
for a recent meta-analysis) and the stressor used in the current study is known to elicit negative affect19, implying 
that focusing only on negative urgency is more relevant.
Methods
Participants. Sixty college students (age 18–25 years) were recruited from the University of Padova. The sam-
ple size was determined based on past work using the same task17. Participants were randomly assigned to be in 
either the stress condition (n = 30; 15 males; mean age = 21.88 years, SD = 0.34) or non-stress condition (n = 30; 
15 males; mean age = 21.77 years, SD = 0.34). Participants provided written informed consent and were paid an 
initial €5. They also received additional monetary compensation based on the result of one randomly selected trial 
from the gambling task. The institutional review board at the University of Padova gave ethical approval for the 
study. Ethical principles were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure. To control for circadian rhythms and stress induced by travel, the experiment was always 
conducted between 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm, as stress levels have been shown to fluctuate throughout the day47. 
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Participants were scheduled for a one-hour experimental session after having provided informed consent. At 
the beginning of the experiment, participants were invited to complete self-report questionnaires (demographic 
questionnaire and perceived stress scale). Next, participants in the stress condition were subjected to a stress 
manipulation (CPT), whereas those in the non-stress condition were engaged in a non-stress manipulation. To 
assess the stress induction, participants completed subjective rating of stress, pain and unpleasantness43. The 
gambling task was administrated directly following the stress-induction condition. The experimenter started the 
computer program and asked the participant to follow the instructions on the screen (see FeldmanHall et al.,17 
for more details about verbal and visual instructions). Upon completion of the gambling task, the short UPPS-P 
scale48 and the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire49 were administered. Data on trait emotional intelli-
gence (not related to the current paper) will be presented elsewhere. Participants were debriefed and paid at the 
end of the experiment.
Stress Induction. The CPT was selected for experimentally inducing acute stress, as it is known to have good 
reliability and validity50, 51 and is not characterized by lasting psychological effects (e.g., stress, mood and nerv-
ousness) that have been related to other types of laboratory stressors52. Participants first held their non-dominant 
arm (to the elbow) in room temperature water for 2 minutes to ensure an equal starting point53. They then trans-
ferred their arm into ice water (0–4 °C) for as long as possible up to 2 min53, 54. A no-stress control condition 
required immersion of the participants’ dominant hand in room-temperature water (32–35 °C) for 2 minutes.
Gambling Task. In each trial of the gambling task17, subjects were endowed with €10 (placed on the table) 
and decided whether to gamble between €0 and €10 of their €10 endowment in increments of €2. If they decided 
to gamble and lost, they would lose their money. In contrast, if they decided to gamble and won the lottery, they 
would double their money. For example, subjects decided to gamble €6 of the €10. In one scenario there is the 
chance to win, double their money (€12), and take home €16 (€12 + the €4 left of their endowment). In the other 
scenario, they would lose their investment of €6 and take home €4 (Fig. 1a). Subjects completed four practice tri-
als before starting the gambling task. The task consists of 36 trials. During each trial, subjects were presented with 
stock image of a computer and were given unlimited time to make their gambling decision (Fig. 1b). After their 
decision, subjects were presented with a fixation cross (jittered duration, 2–6 s) and then either negative feedback 
(“You lost the lottery”) or positive feedback (“You won the lottery”) for 3 s. Following the feedback, there was an 
inter-trial interval (jittered duration, 2–6 s). The trials were presented in random order. Subjects did not receive 
any information about the probability of winning or losing a gamble, implying that the task measures a situation 
of decision-making under ambiguity. They were instructed that all gambles were independent. To ensure that 
subjects believed that, we probed their beliefs about the independence of their gambles during a funnel debrief-
ing after testing. No participants indicated any suspicions regarding the delivered outcomes (wins or losses). 
Figure 1. The gambling task17: (a) example of gambling decisions and (b) schematic of one trial of the task.
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The outcome variable from this task is subjects’ choices to gamble (how much money subjects gambled from 
€0 to €10). One potential predictor from this task is feedback on the previous trial or feedback (See “Statistical 
Analyses” section for further details).
Self-report questionnaires. At the beginning of the experiment, participants completed the perceived 
stress scale (PSS), which assesses the degree to which life events are appraised as stressful55 (Italian translation: 
Fossati56). The PSS contains 10 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very frequently). 
Higher scores reflect higher levels of perceived stress in response to stressful situations. Internal consistency for 
the PPS was adequate in the present sample (α = 0.75, 95% CI [0.65, 0.84]). As the interaction between the trait 
of perceived stress and acute stress could have a significant effect on deliberative/decision-making processes 
rates (e.g., delayed discounting19), participants in the stress-induction condition were compared with those in 
the control condition for the trait of perceived stress at the baseline to isolate the effect of acute stress on choices. 
Demographic information was also collected (gender, age and school attendance). In the present research, the 
PPS and demographic characteristics were used as control variables.
To validate that stress induction was effective, we measured subjective parameters of stressors38. Directly 
after the participants took their hands out of the cold or room-temperature water, ratings of stress, pain and 
unpleasantness were assessed. Subjects rated separately on scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much) 
in 10-point increments: first, how stressful the hand immersion was, then how unpleasant it was, and then how 
painful it was.
Directly after having completed the gambling task, participants completed the short UPPS-P48 (Italian version: 
D’Orta et al.57). The UPPS-P is a 20-item scale assessing five impulsivity traits (four items per dimension) includ-
ing negative urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, sensation seeking and positive urgency. All 
items are scored on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). All of these scales demonstrated 
adequate internal consistency in the present sample: negative urgency (α = 0.79, 95% CI [0.70, 0.87]), (lack of) 
premeditation (α = 0.77, 95% CI [0.66, 0.85]) and (lack of) perseverance (α = 0.88, 95% CI [0.82, 0.92]). For each 
trait, higher scores indicate a higher level of impulsivity.
Statistical Analyses. The statistical analyses were performed in R. Specifically, we used the lme458 and 
lmerTest packages59 in R to run a series of linear mixed-effects models (LMMs; see the results below). Maximum 
likelihood t- and F-tests were conducted by using Satterthwaite approximations for pooled degrees of freedom, 
using the lmerTest package59. To explore the effects of stress and impulsivity traits on individuals’ ability to incor-
porate feedback, we tested and compared two LMMs that included subjects’ choice to gamble (dependent var-
iable; how much money subjects gambled, from 0 to 10€) and all parameters (feedback, condition, impulsivity 
traits, and their interactions); all parameters were included in the model as independent variables (fixed effects). 
The only difference between the two models was the way in which feedback was coded (see the results below). The 
two LMMs were compared, respectively, with a null model, which included only the intercepts and no predic-
tors. The degrees of freedom (df) for all the models correspond to the number of parameters included (i.e., main 
effects, two, and three way interactions) plus one parameter for each random effect, one for the intercept, and one 
for the variance associated with the random effect (i.e., the null model consists of three degree-of-freedom: one 
for the intercept, one for the random effect of subject, and one for the variance associated with it). Finally, in the 
two LMMs we included time as a control variable and subject as a random effect. The within-subjects predictor 
was feedback received on the previous trial, while the between-subjects predictor was condition. Lagged feedback 
(on the previous trial t − 1) was coded as −1 for a loss in the gambling task, as 0 for a trial in which the partici-
pant chose not to gamble, and as 1 for a win in the gambling task (in model 1, M1), while it was coded as 0 for no 
feedback and as 1 for a loss/win (in model 2, M2). (See Supplemental Materials for detailed results of alternative 
models: A learning model in which feedback is coded to take into account the combined outcome of the previous 
three trials (e.g., two wins and one loss), and another model which includes the amount won or lost in the previ-
ous trial as a predictor). The condition was coded as −1 for control and 1 for stress. Time was coded as 1 (trial 1 
to 12), 2 (trial 13 to 24), and 3 (trial 25 to 36).
Results
Preliminary analyses. To allow interpretation of the regression analyses conducted, we had to ascertain that 
(i) there was no sign of multicollinearity; (ii) there were no differences between stress condition and control with 
regard to impulsivity traits; and (iii) the CPT had induced stress, whereas the control condition had not. With 
regard to the check for collinearity, the magnitude of correlation coefficients was relatively modest, ranging from 
−0.06 to 0.47. To control for the presence of multicollinearity, we computed the variance inflation factor (VIF), 
which shows how much the variance of the coefficient estimate is inflated by multicollinearity. VIF values over 
2.5 are considered problematic for multicollinearity60. The VIF values in the present study ranged between 1.02 
to 1.69. Thus, no multicollinearity existed.
In addition, the two groups did not differ significantly in their ratings of impulsivity (see Table 1).
Finally, with regard to stress induction, subjective parameters support that CPT is a reliable stressor (see 
Table 2). Participants experienced significantly more stress, pain and displeasure (stress F(1, 58) = 46.11, p < 0.001, 
ƞ2 = 0.44; pain, F(1, 58) = 155.62, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.73, unpleasant, F(1, 58) = 141.16, p < 0.001, ƞ2 = 0.71) in the stress 
condition than in the control condition. The stressful rating was strongly correlated with the painful (r = 0.75, 
p < 0.001) and unpleasant (r = 0.81, p < 0.001) ratings. In addition, the PSS score (administered before introduc-
ing stress manipulation) did not significantly vary by group (F(1, 58) = 0.05, p = 0.94), implying that participants in 
these groups exhibited similar perceived stress in response to stressful situations (Table 2).
With regard to the money gambled in each condition, subjects gambled approximately the same amount of
money in the control condition and in the stress condition, while participants gambled at a higher rate in the
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stress condition than they did in the control condition (See the Supplemental Material for details; Money
gambled for condition and Choice rate in the lottery game).
Effects of acute stress and impulsivity on sensitivity to feedback: trial-by-trial analysis. To test 
how subjects with higher impulsivity incorporate prior feedback into decision-making under stress, we tested 
and compared the following models: (a) the null model with intercept only and no predictors (M0); (b) the model 
with stress, impulsivity traits, feedback, and their interactions, where feedback was coded as −1 for a loss, 0 for no 
feedback, and 1 for a win (M1); (c) the model with stress, impulsivity traits, and feedback and their interactions, 
where feedback was coded as 0 for no feedback and 1 for a loss/win (M2). The difference between M1 and M2 was 
basically the way in which the feedback was coded. To compare the models, we performed the likelihood ratio test 
and took into consideration the Bayesian information criterion61. Table 3 shows the results for the model compar-
ison. ΔBIC refers to the differences between the null model (M0) and the other models (M1 and M2); a positive 
ΔBIC value indicates that a model (M1 or M2) is better than the null model. Bayes factor (BF) approximations 
were calculated by using the formula exp(ΔBIC/2)62. BF approximations were used to compare the relative evi-
dence for different models. For example, a BF value of 4 indicates that one model is four times more likely than 
the null model (M0). In summary, the higher the ΔBIC and BF approximations, the more likely the model is in 
comparison to the null model. As can be seen in Table 3, M1 showed a better fit than M2.
Table 4 shows the mixed-effects model (M1), while Table 5 displays the planned comparisons (the effects for 
each level of the categorical variables and their interactions with impulsivity traits). With regard to M1, stress and 
the three impulsivity traits (lack of perseverance, lack of premeditation and negative urgency) were not associated 
with the amount of money gambled (Table 4). However, results revealed a main effect of feedback (χ2(2) = 158.60; 
p < 0.001) and time (χ2(1) = 5.87; p = 0.02). Participants gambled less during the final trials (B = −0.17, t = −2.43, 
p = 0.02) (Table 5). A closer inspection of the results (Table 5) indicates that subjects gambled more after expe-
riencing a loss than after deciding not to gamble in the previous trial (B = −11.17, t = −6.48, p < 0.001). There 
were also interactive effects of feedback × lack of perseverance (χ2(2) = 12.29; p = 0.002) and feedback × negative 
urgency (χ2(2) = 15.35; p < 0.001) (Table 4). To probe the interaction effects, we interpreted significant interac-
tions (p < 0.05) by using contrasts63. Results showed that individuals with higher perseverance gambled less after 
deciding not to gamble than after experiencing a loss (B = −0.18, χ2(1) = 5.40, p = 0.02), while those with lower 
perseverance gambled more after experiencing a loss (B = 0.13, χ2(1) = 6.54, p = 0.02) and deciding not to gamble 
(B = 0.32, χ2(1) = 15.46, p < 0.001) than after receiving a win (see Fig. 2). With regard to negative urgency (see 
Fig. 2), individuals with higher negative urgency gambled more after deciding not to gamble than after receiving 
a loss (B = −0.44, χ2(1) = 25.23, p < 0.001) and a win (B = 0.39, χ2(1) = 20.15, p < 0.001). Finally, we found two 
significant three-way interactions: Stress × Feedback × Negative urgency (χ2(2) = 8.24; p = 0.02) and Stress × 
Control Condition Room-
temperature water (n = 30)
Stress Condition Cold 
Pressor Test (n = 30) F(1, 58) p ƞ2
Impulsivity traits
Lack of Premeditation 7.77(0.36) 6.80(0.34) 3.62 0.06
Negative Urgency 8.93(0.49) 8.26(0.48) 0.90 0.34
Lack of Perseverance 7.10(0.45) 7.00(0.45) 0.02 0.88
Table 1. Impulsivity traits between conditions.
Control Condition Room-
temperature water (n = 30)
Stress Condition Cold 
Pressor Test (n = 30) F(1, 58) p ƞ2
Subjective Stress Ratings
 Unpleasant 5.33(1.64) 60.33(4.32) 141.16 <0.001 0.71
 Stressful 7.67(2.33) 42.33(4.54) 46.11 <0.001 0.44
 Painful 3.33(2.10) 60.33(4.05) 155.62 <0.001 0.73
 Perceived Stress Scale (PSS)* 18.33(1.06) 18.20(1.54) 0.005 0.94 0.000
Table 2. Subjective stress ratings and Perceived Stress Scale. *Administered before the stress manipulation.
Model df Chisq p AIC BIC ΔBIC Approx. BF
M0 3 10380 10397
M1 19 165.56 <0.001 10246 10353 43.17 >10,000
M2 19 90.01 <0.001 10322 10429 −32.32 <10,000
Table 3. Model comparisons. M0 = null model; M1 = model with stress, impulsivity traits and feedback 
and their interactions (feedback = −1 for a loss, 0 for no feedback and 1 for a win); M2 = model with stress, 
impulsivity traits and feedback and their interactions (feedback = 0 for no feedback and 1 for a loss/win); df, 
degree of freedom; Chisq, chi-squared ; p, probability value; AIC, Akaike information criterion; BIC, Bayesian 
information criterion; ΔBIC, differences between the null model (M0) and other models (M1, M2); Approx. BF, 
Bayes factor approximation, exp(ΔBIC/2).
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Feedback × Lack of perseverance (χ2(2) = 26.28; p < 0.001) (Table 4). Results showed that the effect of lack of 
perseverance in interaction with stress was significant only for a loss as previous feedback (B = −0.42, χ2(1) = 3.94, 
p = 0.04), but not for a win (p = 0.78) or no feedback (p = 0.64). As can be seen in Fig. 3, individuals in the stress 
condition with lower perseverance gambled more after experiencing a loss than did those in the control condi-
tion. Acute stress appeared to influence how prior feedback (e.g., a loss in the previous trial) was incorporated 
into decisions involving uncertainty for subjects with lower perseverance. No significant interaction contrasts for 
the three-way Stress × Feedback × Negative urgency interaction were found.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to test the influence of individual differences in impulsivity traits on 
decision-making under ambiguity in a setting of laboratory-induced stress. In doing so, the study also served 
as a partial replication of a recent study17 by demonstrating for the first time the interplay between impulsivity 
traits, stress and decision-making under ambiguity. The results showed that a specific impulsivity facet, namely 
lack of perseverance, impacts the way that prior feedback is incorporated into decisions involving ambiguity in a 
condition of laboratory-induced stress. The discussion is divided in two parts. The first part pertains to the effects 
of stress on decisions under ambiguity, whereas the second part regards the moderating role of impulsivity traits 
in these effects.
The results showed that there was no general effect of stress on gambling decisions. Thus, the present study 
replicates many studies that have failed to show an effect of stress on gambling64–66. It is possible that betting 
behaviours in both conditions have been influenced by gambling-related biased cognition, more particularly, 
the gambler’s fallacy phenomenon16, defined as the tendency to respond to losses by increasing one’s bet, which 
reflects an inability to acknowledge the independence of turns. Subjects seemed unable to use a rational perspec-
tive (in the economic sense, see Rabin15), in which each new decision to gamble should be considered an inde-
pendent event. In contrast, participants tended to use irrelevant prior experiences to guide their future choices 
to gamble, regardless of their stress levels. Thus, participants were more likely to gamble after receiving negative 
feedback (a loss in the previous trial) than after receiving positive feedback (a win in the previous trial), which 
is consistent with and replicates the findings of a recent study on the effects of acute stress on decision-making 
under ambiguity17.
These results are also in line with previous studies that used naturalistic gambling settings and reported 
increased risk taking following losses67. At least two potential explanations account for the behavioural results 
observed in the current study. First, individuals gambled more after experiencing a negative outcome in a poten-
tial attempt to recover the recent losses. Chasing losses, or betting more money after losses in an attempt to 
win back the money lost68, 69, is an indicator of misunderstanding gambling outcomes and irrational beliefs 
about the likelihood of winning70 or compromised inhibitory control71. Chasing losses is also known to occur 
within sessions among non-problem gamblers72, 73. Second, as the losing streak develops, the player progressively 
believes that the value of a significant win increasingly surpasses the negative value of a further loss74. According 
to the prospect theory value function, people experience diminishing marginal utility in both the gain and loss 
domains75. In the loss domain, this means that as a losing streak develops, people become more willing to gam-
ble because a further negative outcome will not feel as bad as earlier negative outcomes. At the same time, a 
significant win would help reduce overall losses; therefore, it becomes increasingly attractive in comparison to 
refraining from gambling.
Coeffic χ2 df P values
Feedback 158.60 2 <0.001
Stress 0.45 1 ns
Lack of Perseverance 0.001 1 ns
Lack of Premeditation 0.31 1 ns
Negative Urgency 0.39 1 ns
Time 5.87 1 0.02
Feedback X Negative Urgency 15.36 2 <0.001
Feedback X Lack of Perseverance 12.29 2 0.002
Feedback X Lack of Premeditation 1.72 2 ns
Feedback X Stress 2.07 2 ns
Stress X Negative Urgency 0.35 1 ns
Stress X Lack of Perseverance 1.05 1 ns
Stress X Lack of Premeditation 0.84 1 ns
Feedback X Negative Urgency X Stress 8.24 2 0.02
Feedback X Lack of Premeditation X Stress 4.15 2 ns
Feedback X Lack of Perseverance X Stress 26.28 2 <0.001
Table 4. Results of the linear mixed-effects for the best model M1: Fixed effects of feedback from the previous 
trial (where feedback was coded as −1 for a loss, 0 for no feedback, and 1 for a win), stress and impulsivity traits 
on subjects’ decisions to gamble (i.e., how much money subjects gambled from €0 to €10). The significant effects 
are further explored in Table 5 below.
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The present study shows that impulsivity traits play a crucial role in explaining the differential effect of stress 
in the relationship between prior feedback and choices made under ambiguity. More precisely, we found that 
acute stress appears to influence how feedback is incorporated into decisions involving ambiguity for subjects 
with lower perseverance. Individuals characterized by a lack of perseverance (in the stress condition) seems to 
display a behaviour that resembles the gambler’s fallacy phenomenon. This supports the idea that gambling can 
be self-serving (i.e., it can serve in reducing negative affective states generated by aversive events, e.g., losses in the 
previous trial) and encourage gambling perpetuation, as suggested by motivated reasoning models76. Actually, 
individuals with reduced perseverance are usually prone to boredom, have a limited sense of responsibility and 
present attentional difficulties46. It has been shown that they are less motivated to succeed in work or school77. 
Consequently, they may be easily distracted by exciting activities, such as gambling78. Furthermore, perseverance 
(like premeditation) is associated with the deliberation and self-discipline facets of conscientiousness79. Costa and 
colleagues80 conceptualized conscientiousness as a personality dimension involving both the need for achieve-
ment and commitment to work and moral scrupulousness or cautiousness. Thus, reduced perseverance is likely 
to increase the likelihood of displaying the gambler’s fallacy, as this impulsivity trait is related to less availability 
of general cognitive resources (including difficulties in inhibiting non-relevant thoughts or memories) and less 
conscientiousness of ongoing tasks45, 46. Additionally, according to the revised model of decision-making under 
objective risk conditions9, our results can reflect that acute stress combined with lower perseverance strengthened 
the impulsive system, which in turn may interfere with the controlled extraction of information, deliberation, or 
planning (reflective system), leading participants to act against their better knowledge (e.g., being more focused 
on negative feedback). More specifically, lack of perseverance reduced resistance to proactive interference in 
working memory, sustained attention, and set-shifting capacities45–81, which in turn might result in distractions 
and irrelevant thoughts that may interfere with project completion41. From such a perspective, lower persever-
ance, instead of premeditation (and negative urgency), can be considered a candidate for non-advantageous 
decision-making under ambiguity in conditions of stress. Our results extend the previous literature on feedback 
and stress (see Schiebener and Brand9 for a recent review) by showing the effects of personality traits in the 
relationship between acute stress and learning from previous negative feedback (loss). Disturbed learning from 
negative feedback might thus be the mechanism behind the more disadvantageous decisions reported among 
participants with lower perseverance in the stress condition.
Contrary to our hypotheses, lack of premeditation and negative urgency did not significantly influence how 
previous feedback is incorporated into decision-making under stress. The inconsistent effect of negative urgency 
might be related to the individual characteristics of participants in the current study (non-clinical participants). 
Coeffic Estimate (SE) t value P values
Intercept 8.99(2.38) 4.03 <0.001
Feedback(0) −11.17(1.71) −6.48 <0.001
Feedback(1) −0.46(1.23) −0.37 ns
Stress −5.40(2.89) −1.99 ns
Lack of Perseverance −0.30(0.18) −1.76 ns
Lack of Premeditation −0.01(0.19) 0.03 ns
Negative Urgency −0.11(0.14) −0.87 ns
Time −0.17(0.07) −2.43 0.02
Feedback(0)X Negative Urgency 0.38(0.17) 2.19 0.02
Feedback(1)X Negative Urgency −0.06(0.06) −0.93 ns
Feedback(0)X Lack of Perseverance 0.76(0.15) 4.93 <0.001
Feedback(1)X Lack of Perseverance 0.09(0.09) 1.04 ns
Feedback(0)X Lack of Premeditation 0.13(0.14) 0.92 ns
Feedback(1)X Lack of Premeditation −0.16(0.09) −1.70 ns
Feedback(0)X Stress 8.51(2.30) 3.65 <0.001
Feedback(1)X Stress −0.67(1.46) −0.46 ns
Stress X Negative Urgency −0.01(0.19) −0.09 ns
Stress X Lack of Perseverance 0.50(0.23) 2.32 0.029
Stress X Lack of Premeditation 0.20(0.28) 0.78 ns
Feedback(0)X Negative Urgency X Stress −0.01(0.20) −0.03 ns
Feedback(1)X Negative Urgency X Stress 0.25(0.09) 2.77 0.005
Feedback(0)X Lack of Premeditation X Stress −0.27(0.21) −1.26 ns
Feedback(1)X Lack of Premeditation X Stress 0.15(0.13) 1.15 ns
Feedback(0)X Lack of Perseverance X Stress −0.90(0.18) −4.84 <0.001
Feedback(1)X Lack of Perseverance X Stress −0.35(0.11) −3.09 0.005
Table 5. Planned comparisons for the linear mixed-effects model M1: Fixed effects of feedback of the previous 
trial, stress and impulsivity traits on subjects’ decisions to gamble (i.e., how much money subjects gambled 
from €0 to €10). Feedback = feedback on the previous trial (1 = a win in the gambling task, −1 = a loss in the 
gambling task, 0 =.
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Figure 2. Interaction plot for lack of perseverance/negative urgency and feedback in relation to the amount of 
money gambled. feedback = feedback on the previous trial (win = a win in the gambling task, loss = a loss in the 
gambling task, no feedback = the subject chose not to gamble). Money gambled = subjects’ choices to gamble 
(i.e., how much money subjects gambled from €0 to €10). Confidence bands of 95% are presented in grey/red/
green.
Figure 3. Interaction plot for impulsivity traits, condition and feedback in relation to the amount of money 
gambled. Money = gambled subjects’ choices to gamble (i.e., how much money subjects gambled from €0 to 
€10). Feedback = feedback on the previous trial (win = a win in the gambling task, loss = a loss in the gambling 
task, no feedback = the subject chose not to gamble). Confidence bands of 95% are presented in grey/red.
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Generally, negative urgency is a risk factor for addictive behaviours82 rather than a potential predictor of 
non-pathological behaviour (e.g., at-risk or problem gambling). Thus, negative urgency could explain impaired 
performance on decision-making in a sample of pathological gamblers. With regard to lack of premeditation, it 
seems likely that this impulsivity facet is more related to a tendency to act without forethought in general, i.e. not 
in arousal or emotional contexts such as that in the current study. From such a perspective, lack of premedita-
tion rather reflects poor deliberative processes (e.g., not taking into account all available information prior to a 
decision). This is in line with past research showing that lack of premeditation is related to difficulties in delaying 
rewards83 or that it predicts involvement in behaviours with tangible long-term negative outcomes for health, 
such as smoking84.
Some limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First, stress induction was assessed using subjective 
parameters of stressors43. Although several studies measured stress responses capturing subjective responses37, 43, 
physiological responses to stress should be incorporated into future studies17, 85. Second, the present study indi-
cated that impulsivity traits interact with acute stress induction to predict decision-making under stress, yet other 
unconsidered personality variables that have been linked to decisions and stress responses (e.g., neuroticism86) 
should also be considered potential moderators in future research. Third, developmental differences in feedback 
processing87 and stress88 have been documented. A better understanding of how age, stress and decision-making 
interact is also warranted and deserves further investigation. Finally, we did not collect data on executive func-
tions. Assessing the executive functions would be a valuable addition to the literature, as these functions are 
important for (i) developing a decision-making strategy, (ii) applying decision-making strategies, and (iii) revis-
ing decision-making strategies according to feedback9.
Despite these limitations, the present study is likely the first that clarified the moderating effects of impulsiv-
ity traits on the relationship between feedback processing and decision-making under stress. In particular, the 
current findings support the view that young healthy adults with reduced perseverance gamble more after experi-
encing a loss when they have experienced stress compared to those who did not experience stress. Although our 
results were obtained in non-clinical participants, they potentially open up avenues for interventions targeting 
decision-making-related pathologies, such as disordered gambling or substance abuse. Individuals with reduced 
perseverance may benefit from interventions designed to help them become familiar with important concepts 
related to gambling such as independent events, myths and facts and responsible choices89. Other interventions to 
consider are those that help individuals face and accept adverse emotions without relying on dysfunctional coping 
aiming to relieve negative affect in the short term without considering long-term consequences. Examples of such 
interventions might include mindfulness-based group interventions because they are able to reduce urgency and 
increase perseverance (the two impulsivity facets shown to influence gambling behaviours in the current study) 
in adolescents with emotion regulation difficulties90. These interventions can help gamblers transfer the locus of 
control for stress from external conditions (i.e., feedback-related gambling) to attentional resources and reduce 
salience and myopic focus on rewards (i.e., by undermining the intrinsic value that gamblers assign to potential 
wins)91.
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